inquiries into credible allegations of gross negligence and to issue reports evaluating the claims.
At the outset, I admit that my reference to the idea as "modest" is (partially) tongue-in-cheek. If implemented, it would not represent a modest reform, but rather would constitute a significant innovation in Delaware practice -perhaps not as dramatic as Swift's proposal to cook and eat Irish children, but still unusual for Delaware. But the proposal is modest in other respects. It does not pretend to eliminate bad decisions by corporate boards. Stupidity and fecklessness in the boardroom will survive any efforts to improve Delaware law. Further, I am under no illusion that the proposal will be implemented any time soon. I offer the concept instead as a thought experiment -a way to stimulate ideas about one of the more challenging puzzles in American corporate law. 
I. Delaware's Regulation of Managerial Performance
Perhaps the most fundamental principle of corporate law is that directors direct.
Except in unusual cases, members of the board of directors enjoy the power and responsibility to manage corporations. 4 Having conferred such a power, one might think that states, including Delaware, would penalize directors who fail to exercise due care in reaching important decisions. A first impression would confirm the expectation:
Delaware does purport to police against gross negligence by corporate directors. But this is an illusion. Delaware offers no meaningful judicial regulation of managerial decisionmaking processes, either by way of legal liability or through moralistic criticism of director actions.
5
A. Liability
The duty of care officially requires directors to exercise some degree of skill and diligence in the management of the companies they serve. 6 Directors who fail in this 4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a). 5 Commentators are unanimous, or nearly so, in observing that Delaware provides precious little judicial regulation of managerial performance. See (1999) ("there really is no director duty of care in the decision-making context in Delaware, at least beyond a duty simply to be informed."). 6 Early formulations, drawn from the law of trusts, defined the directors' duty by a negligence standard: they were supposed to exercise reasonable care in their conduct of a corporation's affairs. For a traditional formulation drawn from the law of trusts, see Restatement of Trusts §174 (1935) (trustees owe a duty "to exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property"). Delaware imported the trust standard to the corporate law setting in Graham v. The judicial commentary option thus offers some potential to function as a parallel system of scrutiny and oversight -one that makes up, at least to some extent, for the lack of legal liability for violations of the duty of care. As currently administered, however, judicial commentary is subject to defects that makes it ineffective as an oversight mechanism:
1. The authority of judges to engage in gratuitous commentary is unclear. Judges are supposed to explain why a plaintiff did or did not obtain relief under the law. They are not supposed to engage in free-floating inquisitions or offer unsolicited advice. It is perhaps for this reason that comments on managerial performance in Delaware opinions sometimes seem like judicial Tourette's Syndrome -imprecations oddly disconnected from the lawyerly discussion in which they are embedded. basis on which to offer his or her opinions about the quality of management's decision processes.
II. Judicial Capacity
The upshot is that neither liability nor commentary offers effective judicial oversight of managerial decision processes. The question then arises whether Delaware law might usefully be reformed to increase the effectiveness of judicial oversight.
One possible answer is that nothing should be done. The justification for inaction is that Delaware courts lack the ability to monitor director conduct. 31 Lacking business judgment, courts will only make things worse if they try to intervene. The marketplace, not the courthouse, should therefore be the monitor of director quality.
Although there is force to this argument, I believe that it goes too far in removing the courts from any role in monitoring managerial quality. We certainly do not want judges running corporations. Nor do we want judges sniping at ordinary exercises of business judgment. On the other hand, I believe that judges can have a constructive role to play as backstops when it comes to requiring that boards adequately inform themselves about the decisions they undertake and engage in proper deliberations. Given their extensive expertise and background in corporate decision processes, it is clear that Chancery Court judges have the ability to judge whether the board adequately informed itself of the issues pertinent to a matter brought before them for action and engaged in due deliberations on the matter under review.
III. Approaches to Enhanced Judicial Monitoring
If we accept that Chancery Court judges have the sophistication and judgment to assess whether the board adequately informed itself and exercised proper deliberations, the question becomes whether and how the law might be reformed in order to draw on that knowledge for the benefit of Delaware corporations.
One possibility is to make directors actually pay for acts of gross negligence. 35 If directors faced a genuine risk of personal liability they might display more diligence in investigating proposed decisions and might think twice before signing on to proposals which in their hearts they view as bad for the companies they serve.
The idea of imposing genuine damages liability for acts of mismanagement is subject to serious objections, however. Politically it is a non-starter: Delaware public corporations have massively manifested their wish to exempt directors from personal liability for good faith breaches of the duty of care, and it is nearly inconceivable that the Delaware legislature would attempt to remove an immunity previously conferred. Even if such a reform were feasible, it might not be wise. Given the complex and overlapping protections available to managers in the form of liability insurance and indemnification, it would be difficult to devise a system that would actually put the directors' personal assets at risk in duty of care lawsuits. Awarding fees to an unsuccessful plaintiff, although certainly unusual, is not fundamentally inconsistent with the spirit of Delaware's fee jurisprudence in corporate cases. Even if no monetary relief has been obtained, Delaware judges often award fees to successful plaintiffs, payable from the corporate treasury, based on a "common benefit" theory. The idea is that the litigation has conferred a benefit on the corporation that justifies compensation for the plaintiff's litigation costs.
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In some cases there is precious little substance to the "common benefit" that is cited as the justification for awarding fees to plaintiffs' counsel. An example is Citron v.
corporate raider. Eventually the parties settled, with the company agreeing not to make block repurchases over any twelve month period without the prior approval of a majority of the non-management directors. This relief was essentially meaningless. The company had already engaged in a similar procedure, without any judicial compulsion, in the very stock repurchase that the derivative plaintiff was challenging. Moreover, it was highly unlikely that the company, even without the settlement agreement, would undertake an action over the opposition of a majority of its independent directors.
Notwithstanding that the "relief" was a gossamer thread with no real substance, the Chancery Court awarded attorneys' fees to the derivative plaintiff, observing that "with respect to the claim for counsel fees, I again recognize the standing and ability of plaintiff's local and New York counsel in corporate litigation. This factor together with the contingent nature of the representation and the benefit conferred suggest that full compensation is justified. Although the discovery effort of plaintiff's counsel has not been extensive it has been directed to the nub of defendant's business judgment The fees were awarded, we may infer, because the court felt that counsel had provided some benefit to the corporation by conducting the litigation. But if fees can be awarded to plaintiffs who in every meaningful sense lost their cases, even though they could doctor up a settlement agreement as a partial victory, it is only a small step to say that fees can be awarded to parties who in fact lost the litigation, but whose efforts conferred benefits on the corporation by exploring credible charges that the decision-making processes at the firm failed to live up to the standards one would expect from wellmanaged firms.
A publicly-announced policy of awarding fees to losing litigants in situations such as this could help correct for the fatal flaw in the current judicial commentary remedy.
Courts cannot engage in commentary if they do not have cases, and cases will not be brought if the attorney does not anticipate a fee. But if attorneys could obtain a fee for litigating a duty of care case well, even if they are not ultimately successful in establishing liability, they might be more willing to bring such cases in the first place.
The strategy of awarding fees to unsuccessful derivative is worthy of consideration as an approach to revitalizing the duty of care, especially because it involves only a minor adjustment to current Delaware practice. But the effect of such a reform is also likely to be relatively small. First, Delaware courts would retain discretion to deny fees in unsuccessful cases, or to award less in fees than counsel requests. They have a habit of awarding niggardly fees in cases generating therapeutic relief, and they resulted in "no more than an arguable therapeutic benefit to the class"); In re Diamond Shamrock Corp., 1988 WL 94752 (Del. Ch. Sept. 14, 1988) (awarding fee for corrective disclosure). might be even less generous when the case fails completely. Second, there remains the danger of settlement: if, as often happens, the parties settle with no admission of misconduct, the court would lack a sufficient basis for making judgments about the quality of the director's decision processes. Third, because these cases would be premised on the claim that the defendants had violated a legal obligation, the court's evaluation of director conduct would tend to be focused on the legal standard -again impeding the ability of the judge to make general judgments about director decision processes. Despite these limitations, the option of awarding fees to losing derivative plaintiffs in duty of care cases offers potential to improving the performance of Delaware corporations.
B. Judicial Inquiries
An alternative approach is the judicial inquiry: an official investigation into plausible claims of gross negligence coupled with a public report on the results of that review.
1. The Procedure I envisage the following procedure, which would need to be authorized by the Delaware legislature. 42 Any person (the "relator") could file a petition containing 42 The model set forth here is only one of many approaches. It envisages an inquiry conducted by a single judge using procedures similar to those already familiar in shareholders derivative litigation. But judicial inquiries could also be conducted by panels of fact-finders. It is not essential, moreover, that the inquiries be conducted by judges. Although members of the judiciary have certain advantages, any reputable and qualified person could perform the task. And the procedures used in judicial inquiries do not have to be similar to those of a trial. For example, the judge could take a more active role in structuring the inquiry, perhaps emulating the inquisitorial style of judging found in continental Europe. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 834 (1985) . The model put forward here is advanced in the hope of focusing discussion and stimulating thought about innovative ways for enhancing the monitoring of director decision processes.
particularized allegations of gross negligence and requesting an inquiry. 43 The relator would serve notice on the corporation and its directors, who would be afforded reasonable time to file oppositions providing reasons why an inquiry should not be held.
The petition and any opposing papers would be assigned to a Chancery Court judge, who would evaluate whether the facts alleged in the petition would, if true, support a plausible inference of gross negligence. If the judge concludes that the petition is insufficiently specific, or that the facts alleged do not support a plausible inference of gross negligence, then he or she would reject the request for an inquiry. If the petition survives this threshold, then the judge would consider whether, going forward, a judicial inquiry would likely improve the management of the company or of Delaware corporations across the board. If the judge concludes that the answer to this second question is yes, he or she would initiate an inquiry. If the answer is no he or she would reject the petition.
If the Chancery Court judge determined to initiate an inquiry, he or she would select counsel to present the facts and arguments against the accused directors. The matter would presumptively be assigned to someone proposed by the relator; but if the court could also appoint different counsel. The relator's counsel would conduct discovery, including document production and oral depositions under oath of fact and expert witnesses. Counsel for the company and its directors could object to any discovery on grounds of privilege, relevance, or burden, and could also take discovery from the relator's witnesses. The judge would have discretion to limit discovery or to direct that discovery be provided even if not demanded by the relator's counsel. 43 In this respect, the petition could resemble securities fraud complaints brought under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. At any point in the process, counsel for the company or the directors could petition to terminate the inquiry on the grounds that the allegations have been shown to be unsubstantiated or that further inquiry would harm the company. The relator's counsel could object to such a petition. The judge would have discretion to grant or reject the petition in whole or in part. The judge could also determine to terminate or limit the inquiry sua sponte.
This process would not be a lawsuit. For this reason the parties would not have the power to settle the matter privately. The parties could jointly petition to terminate or limit the inquiry, and the judge would give those requests considerable weight. However, the decision about whether to continue the inquiry, and on what terms, would be for the judge alone.
At the conclusion of discovery, or at any time during that process, the judge would convene a hearing to consider arguments and evidence. The judge would ordinarily conduct the proceeding on the model of a trial. However, the judge could in his or her discretion depart from trial-type procedures and conduct the hearing in a different way. The hearing would ordinarily be public; but the judge could, if he or she deems it appropriate, conduct all or some of the discussion on a confidential basis.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge would solicit summaries and arguments from counsel and then compose a report. The report would not assess liability and would not reach legal conclusions. Rather it would set forth findings of fact and express the judge's views about the board's decision processes. The report would ordinarily be made public in its entirety, although the judge would have discretion to redact portions in the interest of confidentiality or the protection of privacy. Information obtained during the investigation could be used in subsequent litigation subject to ordinary rules of evidence. The relator would be entitled to petition the judge for a reasonable attorneys' fee payable from the company's treasury, based on the therapeutic value (if any) of the services rendered.
Pros and Cons
I now turn to an analysis of pros and cons of the judicial inquiry idea, looking first This is not a situation where a judge takes on a non-judicial responsibility that might compromise independence --as might be the case, for example, if the judge took temporary service as a prosecutor and then ruled, as judge, on some matter growing out 47 The most famous American investigation of all, the Warren Commission, was chaired by the sitting inclined to impose a significant haircut on the fee request. In a judicial inquiry, on the other hand, there is no expectation that the relator will obtain any relief at all. The court can therefore feel comfortable in awarding a fee based on the quality of the relator's work. If a relator has survived the threshold screen by providing the court with plausible allegations of gross negligence, she can have some degree of confidence that a reasonable effort to support those claims in the ensuring judicial inquiry will be rewarded with a suitably compensatory fee.
IV. Conclusion
This paper has offered a modest proposal for fixing Delaware's broken duty of care: enhance the ability of Chancery Court judges to engage in commentary on the procedures used by the board in making important decisions. One means for upgrading the judicial commentary remedy is for judges to award attorneys' fees to unsuccessful plaintiffs whose efforts have exposed significant shortcomings in the decision-making process. Another option is the judicial inquiry into credible allegations of gross
